Astana Agreement

In addition, the Syrian government said that while it would abide by the agreement, it would continue to fight “terrorism” wherever it exists. As things stand, it seems unlikely that the Astana Agreement will be a resounding success. It can mitigate violence and improve the humanitarian situation in some areas, but if it begins to crumble, it could also lead to destabilizing blame between the three signatories and their allies. While the deal is unlikely to end the Syrian conflict, it could help shape its future – for better or for worse. In order to limit the impact of these disagreements and consolidate Russia`s influence on the Syrian peace process, Moscow is reaching out to Arab countries in concert to create community zones. These diplomatic rapprochements have been enthusiastically supported by Iran and Turkey, as the regional position of both countries benefits from acting as guarantors of a broader peace process. In a remarkable success for this policy, Lebanon and Iraq participated in the Astana talks for the first time as observer States on 1 and 2 August. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova hailed the development as a step that could strengthen Syria`s regional trade relations. Marianna Belenkaya, a prominent Moscow journalist, said the inclusion of all of Syria`s neighbors except Israel in the Astana peace talks would increase the international prestige of the negotiations.

The Syrian regime`s chief negotiator, Bashar Jaafari, left the meeting prematurely because there could be no common ground to strengthen a ceasefire agreement before the end of the talks. But the Astana trio still agreed on de-escalation zones to reduce violence. Although it worked for a short time to reduce the bombing of the Russian and Syrian regimes in opposition-held areas, its effect did not last. The Astana agreement states that signatory states and their Syrian allies must “take all necessary measures” to combat UN-sanctioned jihadists such as the self-proclaimed Islamic State and Tahrir al-Sham, a successor to the al-Qaeda-linked al-Qaeda Front in Syria, both “inside and outside de-escalation zones.” Coincidentally, the geography of the Syrian conflict has sealed off ISIS in eastern Syria, where it is fighting against al-Assad`s army or US-backed Kurds and will be largely unrelated to the implementation of the Astana agreement – but Tahrir al-Sham is nestled between the rebels in each of the four proposed de-escalation zones. In northwestern Syria, it is even the dominant group. The talks ended without a final ceasefire agreement, allegedly due to the refusal of the anti-government side to accept new Russian conditions to control Idlib province. [110] However, too many agreements have failed in the past that could have saved lives and reduced suffering. Let me therefore make it clear that this agreement simply needs to be successful. We owe it to the estimated 2.6 million people in these four de-escalation zones.

We – the United Nations – stand ready to work with all parties concerned to make this a viable agreement – one that will make a tangible difference to the civilian population on the ground; assistance that facilitates the provision of life-saving assistance based on the United Nations` own needs assessments, without constant interference, without reducing the number of beneficiaries, by removing medical and other vital goods from malice, bureaucratic constraints and procedural and physical obstacles. Despite these seemingly successful negotiations, Russia remains concerned about the growing scale of its disagreements with Iran and Turkey over Syria. Russia`s recent efforts to dilute Iran`s hegemony over the Syrian army through security sector reform and Iran`s reluctance to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad`s efforts to take control of Idlib have exacerbated discord between Moscow and Tehran. Russia is also frustrated by Turkey`s inability to disarm the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) militias in Idlib and its refusal to return full control of Afrin to the Assad government. On Thursday, envoys from Russia, Turkey and Iran met in the Kazakh capital Astana to sign an agreement on Syria. When the signing process began, they were suddenly interrupted by a cry from a member of the Syrian opposition: “Iran is a criminal, it has no right to be one of the guarantor countries.” Opposition delegates then marched angrily out of the room. The government`s three negotiators appear to have rejected it and signed the deal, which provided Syria with another ceasefire agreement to end its six-year war. So what does he say? Representatives of the Syrian government and some armed opposition groups will meet in the Kazakh capital Astana on Monday to discuss the implementation of a permanent ceasefire agreement. France announced that the “Syrian opposition” had reached an agreement in Riyadh and “adopted a common program.” [44] In addition to France and Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar also supported this “High Negotiating Committee”.

[46] Russia and Turkey – but not so much Iran – have constantly tried to involve the US in the Astana process. The US has held back, both out of disillusionment at Russia`s failure to rein in al-Assad in previous ceasefire attempts, and to protest Moscow`s undermining of a US-Russian chemical weapons deal in Syria – but also because the Americans are still not convinced of the prospects of success of the Astana trail. The Russians, however, seem to be hoping that the new de-escalation zones could please President Donald Trump, whose rather vague Syrian policy includes both the desire to reduce the US confrontation with al-Assad and to establish some sort of safe zones to which refugees can be returned. The 4 May agreement explicitly mentions the return of refugees as one of the objectives of the four de-escalation zones. The most obvious problem is that the May 4 deal was signed by Lavrentyev, Önal and Ansari – a Russian, a Turk and an Iranian. No Syrian has put his pen on paper, although it was written to end what remains a civil war between Syrians despite all its international commitment. Four de-escalation zones are identified in the agreement: the Islamist-controlled opposition enclave in and around Idlib in northwestern Syria; the Rastan-Talbiseh enclave north of Homs; the ghouta enclave east of Damascus; and rebel-held areas in the Huran and Golan areas near the Jordanian border. Indeed, the agreement amounts to a ceasefire between President Bashar al-Assad and internationally backed sections of the Syrian opposition, while leaving Turkey free to continue its war against hostile Kurdish factions and allowing all parties to wage war on the so-called Islamic State. On October 30, 2015, the first round of peace talks on Syria took place in Vienna, attended by foreign ministers from 20 countries: the United States, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, China, Britain, France, Italy, Germany and other countries. Ministers agreed that the Syrian government and the opposition should start political talks. [30] [31] The second round of the Vienna talks in mid-November resulted in an agreement on the need to convene representatives of the Syrian government and the opposition for formal negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations with a deadline of January 1, 2016.

[32] Even if the fighting stops, there are other potential catches. Under previous ceasefires and local ceasefire agreements, it has often been impossible to get the Syrian government to abide by agreements signed to release prisoners and allow humanitarian aid in besieged areas. The rebels were certainly also rebellious and unreliable negotiators, but the government`s behavior is much more consistent, as it holds most of the prisoners, is responsible for most of the sieges, and can control access to the United Nations and the Red Crescent. If al-Assad doesn`t want to play the game or doesn`t care enough about imposing discipline in the ranks, the deals inevitably fail. The three men who signed the new Astana agreement were the President`s Russian envoy for Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev, Deputy Undersecretary of State Sedat Önal of the Turkish Foreign Ministry and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Jaberi Ansari. .