Schnakenberg, K. E. & Fariss, C. J. (2014). Dynamic models of human rights practices. Political Science Research and Methods, 2(01), 1-31. Cingranelli, D. L. & Richards, D. L. (2008).
The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset Version, 03/2008/12 www.humanrightsdata.org. Smith, K. E. (1998). The application of political conditionality in the EU`s relations with third countries: how effective is it? European Foreign Affairs Review, 3, 253-274. Mosley, L. (2010). Labour rights and multinational production. ==References=====External links===Kreutz`s (2015) coding of EU intervention does not include the suspension of aid, which is the most commonly used tool to enforce violations of the human rights clause.
There is very little overlap between its cases of military/economic intervention and the cases of article 96 consultations discussed here. Bartels, L. (2005). Conditionality of human rights in EU international agreements. ==External links==Conrad, C., & Ritter, E. H. (2013). Treaties, tenure and torture: the contradictory national implications of international law.
Zeitschrift für Politik, 75 (2), 397-409. According to the proposals of Berry et al. (2012), we can identify two symmetrical interactive hypotheses: (1) the effect of the clause is positive when aid/trade dependence is high, and (2) the effect of aid/trade dependence is positive in the presence of a human rights clause. While dependence on development aid and trade is low, we do not expect the clause to have a significant impact on the exercise of rights. In the absence of a clause, we do not necessarily expect development aid or trade dependence to have an effect. Furuoka, F. (2005). Human Rights Conditionality and Aid Allocation: A Case Study on Japanese Foreign Policy. Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 4(2), 125–146. Hathaway, O. (2005).
Between power and principle: an integrated theory of international law. The Law Journal of the University of Chicaco, 72(2), 469-536. Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement is an example of this. While the EU has sometimes withheld aid without a suspension clause (Smith 1998, 264), the clause provides for a formal mechanism. 70% of the years of countries involved in a human rights clause have also been involved in a suspension clause. Keywords: European Union, human rights, conditionality, international trade, international law, ultra vires, external relations, EU, constitutional law, saltnes agreement, J. D. (2013). EU human rights policy: unpacking the literature on EU implementation of aid conditionality. ARENA Centre for European Studies, March.
www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-papers2013/wp2-13.pdf. In 1997, Australia rejected a cooperation agreement because of its objections to the human rights clause (Smith, 1998, p. 264); in our literature review, this is the only example we found. We only code for agreements that have entered into force. Clemens, D. (2012). Human Rights in Canada`s Domestic and Foreign Policy. Human Rights Quarterly, 34(3), 751-778. Cingranelli, D. L.
& Richards, D. L. (1999). Measurement of the level, model and order of respect by the State for the rights to physical integrity. International Studies Quarterly, 43(2), 407-417. Kim, H. & Sikkink, K. (2010). Explanation of the deterrent effect of human rights prosecutions on countries with economies in transition. International Studies Quarterly, 54, pp. 939-963. The Lomé and Cotonou Conventions and all the Association Agreements explicitly serve as a framework for trade and aid.
Cooperation agreements mainly concern trade, but aid is included in the mechanisms of political dialogue and cooperation agreements. See Wu (2013, 348), Miller (2004, 21). Introduction Part I 1:Development of human rights clauses 2:Human rights clauses in practice 3:Human rights clauses in context Part II 4:Interpretation of human rights clauses 5:Procedure under human rights clauses 6:Substantive obligations under human rights clauses Part 7: Competence of the Community to include human rights clauses in international agreements 8: Obligations of Member States to fulfil international obligations imposed by the ultra vires community have been entered into conclusion Richards, D. L. (2016). The myth of the effects of information in human rights data. Human Rights Quarterly, 38(2), 477-492. For links between different types of human rights, see also Fariss and Schnakenberg (2014). Nielsen, R.
A. (2013). Rewarding human rights? Selective aid sanctions against repressive States. International Studies Quarterly, 57, 791-803. For human rights treaties, see Conrad and Ritter (2013); Lupu (2015); Neumayer (2005); Simmons (2009). Compared to global treaties, human rights clauses in economic agreements activate very different mechanisms of influence and are likely to be effective under different conditions. Kreutz, J. (2015).
Human rights, geostrategy and EU foreign policy, 1989-2008. International Organization, 69, 195-217. This variable was coded using the European Union`s records of its legal agreements with third countries (available under ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/searchByCountryAndContinent.do?id=4&letter=A). Crawford, G. (1997). Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Coherence. Democratization, 4(3), 69-108. Conrad, C. R. (2014). Different incentives for dictators: national institutions and (international promises not to do so) torture.
Zeitschrift für Konfliktlösung, 58 (1), 34-67. Kunst, K. (2000). Integrating human rights into development cooperation: the case of the Lomé Convention. While aid may fluctuate in part in response to human rights, a country`s GDP (the denominator of our action) is plausibly exogenous to such interactions between the EU and the country in question. Cingranelli and Richards (2008). The index reflects human rights practices, not legislation. It is coded on the basis of the annual human rights reports of Amnesty International and the US Department of State. Cingranelli and Richards (1999) show that offences in the four constituent domains are hierarchically related and can therefore be aggregated into a single ordered index.
Neumayer, E. (2005). Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights? Zeitschrift für Konfliktlösung, 49 (6), 925-953. Hafner-Burton, E.M., & Tsutsui, K. (2005). Human rights in a globalized world: the paradox of empty promises. American Journal of Sociology, 110 (5), 1373-1411. Cuyckens, H. (2010). Human rights clauses in agreements between the Community and third countries: the case of the Cotonou Agreement.
Working Paper, March. www.law.kuleuven.be/iir/nl/onderzoek/wp/WP147e.pdf.. .